Noûs 41 (1):33–63 (2007)
AbstractAn essay on Kant's theory of justification, where by “justification” is meant the evaluative concept that specifies conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence. Kant employs both epistemic and non-epistemic concepts of justification: an epistemic concept of justification sets out conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence and a candidate (if true and Gettier-immune) for knowledge. A non-epistemic concept of justification, by contrast, sets out conditions under which attitudes are rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence but not candidates for knowledge (even if true). The latter conditions will typically be “pragmatic” or “practical,” and thus license acceptance from a “practical” point of view. For Kant, only broadly-speaking practical reasons can provide adequate motivation for adopting a positive attitude towards a proposition (rather than suspending judgment) in the absence of sufficient epistemic grounds.
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Citations of this work
Kant on Cognition and Knowledge.Eric Watkins & Marcus Willaschek - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3195-3213.
The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis.Julien Dutant - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.
On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:35-104.
Kant on Reason as the Capacity for Comprehension.Karl Schafer - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
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