Authors
Chuanfei Chin
National University of Singapore
Abstract
Most philosophical accounts of scientific models assume that models represent some aspect, or some theory, of reality. They also assume that interpretation plays only a supporting role. This paper challenges both assumptions. It proposes that models can be used in science to interpret reality. (a) I distinguish these interpretative models from representational ones. They find new meanings in a target system’s behaviour, rather than fit its parts together. They are built through idealisation, abstraction and recontextualisation. (b) To show how interpretative models work, I offer a case study on the scientific controversy over foetal pain. It highlights how pain scientists use conflicting models to interpret the human foetus and its behaviour, and thereby to support opposing claims about whether the foetus can feel pain. (c) I raise a sceptical worry and a methodological challenge for interpretative models. To address the latter, I use my case study to compare how interpretative and representational models ought to be evaluated.
Keywords Scientific model  Interpretation  Representation  Meaning  Foetal pain
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.11.038
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

How Models Are Used to Represent Reality.Ronald N. Giere - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):742-752.
Models and Representation.Richard Hughes - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (4):336.
Modeling Mechanisms.Stuart Glennan - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2):443-464.
Other Minds.Alec Hyslop - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-06-14

Total views
367 ( #27,288 of 2,499,401 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #67,534 of 2,499,401 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes