Kant-Studien 105 (4):573-597 (2014)

Authors
Andrew Chignell
Princeton University
Abstract
My goal in this paper is to show that Kant’s prohibition on certain kinds of knowledge of things-in-themselves is motivated less by his anti-soporific encounter with Hume than by his new view of the distinction between “real” and “logical” modality, a view that developed out of his reflection on the rationalist tradition in which he was trained. In brief: at some point in the 1770’s, Kant came to hold that a necessary condition on knowing a proposition is that one be able to prove that all the items it refers to are either really possible or really impossible. Most propositions about things-in-themselves, in turns out, cannot meet this condition. I conclude by suggesting that the best interpretation of this modal condition is as a kind of coherentist constraint.
Keywords Kant  Knowledge  Coherence  Cognition  Ignorance  Things-in-Themselves
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DOI 10.1515/kant-2014-0027
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Kant on Cognizing Oneself as a Spontaneous Cognizer.Markus Kohl - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):395-412.

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