Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press (2015)

Authors
Mazviita Chirimuuta
University of Pittsburgh
Abstract
Is color real or illusory, mind independent or mind dependent? Does seeing in color give us a true picture of external reality? The metaphysical debate over color has gone on at least since the seventeenth century. In this book, M. Chirimuuta draws on contemporary perceptual science to address these questions. Her account integrates historical philosophical debates, contemporary work in the philosophy of color, and recent findings in neuroscience and vision science to propose a novel theory of the relationship between color and physical reality. Chirimuuta offers an overview of philosophy’s approach to the problem of color, finds the origins of much of the familiar conception of color in Aristotelian theories of perception, and describes the assumptions that have shaped contemporary philosophy of color. She then reviews recent work in perceptual science that challenges philosophers’ accounts of color experience. Finally, she offers a pragmatic alternative whereby perceptual states are understood primarily as action-guiding interactions between a perceiver and the environment. The fact that perceptual states are shaped in idiosyncratic ways by the needs and interests of the perceiver does not render the states illusory. Colors are perceiver-dependent properties, and yet our awareness of them does not mislead us about the world. Colors force us to reconsider what we mean by accurately presenting external reality, and, as this book demonstrates, thinking about color has important consequences for the philosophy of perception and, more generally, for the philosophy of mind.
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ISBN(s) 0262029081   9780262029087
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References found in this work BETA

The Cognitive Faculties.Gary Hatfield - 1998 - In Daniel Garber & Michael Ayers (eds.), The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 953–1002.
Metaphysics and the New Science.Gary Hatfield - 1990 - In David Lindberg & Robert Westman (eds.), Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution, ed. by and (Cambridge:. Cambridge University Press. pp. 93–166.
Objectivity and Subjectivity Revisited: Colour as a Psychobiological Property.Gary Hatfield - 2003 - In Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press. pp. 187--202.

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Citations of this work BETA

How Beliefs Are Like Colors.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7889-7918.
A Critique of Olfactory Objects.Ann-Sophie Barwich - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
Objectivist Reductionism.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2021 - In Fiona Macpherson & Derek Brown (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Colour. London: Routledge.
How to Make Reflectance a Surface Property.Nicholas Danne - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 70:19-27.
Making Worlds with Symbols.Paul Teller - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 21):5015-5036.

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