On the Logical Philosophy of Assertive Graphs

Journal of Logic, Language and Information 29 (4):375-397 (2020)
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Abstract

The logic of assertive graphs is a modification of Peirce’s logic of existential graphs, which is intuitionistic and which takes assertions as its explicit object of study. In this paper we extend AGs into a classical graphical logic of assertions whose internal logic is classical. The characteristic feature is that both AGs and ClAG retain deep-inference rules of transformation. Unlike classical EGs, both AGs and ClAG can do so without explicitly introducing polarities of areas in their language. We then compare advantages of these two graphical approaches to the logic of assertions with a reference to a number of topics in philosophy of logic and to their deep-inferential nature of proofs.

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Daniele Chiffi
Politecnico di Milano

Citations of this work

Abduction and diagrams.Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen - forthcoming - Logic Journal of the IGPL.

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References found in this work

The Runabout Inference-Ticket.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Analysis 21 (2):38-39.
Frege.Michael Dummett - 1975 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):149-188.

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