Ratio Juris 21 (2):248-267 (2008)

Abstract. The paper argues for the following points: (1) Marmor's own understanding of "legal positivism" is different from the understanding defended, e.g., by Herbert Hart and Norberto Bobbio, and apparently misleads him into the wrong track of a theoretical inversion; (2) Marmor's two-stages model of (legal) interpretation—the understanding-interpretion model—provides no support for Marmor's own positivistic theory of law; (3) Marmor's concept of interpretation is at odds both with the basic tenets of Hartian and Continental methodological legal positivism, on the one hand, and with the actual practice of legal interpretation in the Western world, on the other hand; (4) Marmor's concept of an easy case is likewise objectionable.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2008.00389.x
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The Concept of Law.Hla Hart - 1961 - Oxford University Press.
Normative Systems.D. G. Londey - 1973 - Philosophical Quarterly 23 (92):280.
[Book Review] Interpretation and Legal Theory. [REVIEW]Marmor Andrei - 1994 - In Peter Singer (ed.), Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 105--1.
Three Separation Theses.James Morauta - 2004 - Law and Philosophy 23 (2):111-135.

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