Abstract
Naturalistic theories of disease appeal to concepts of biological function, and use the notion of dysfunction as the basis of their definitions. Debates in the philosophy of biology demonstrate how attributing functions in organisms and establishing the function-dysfunction distinction is by no means straightforward. This problematization of functional ascription has undermined naturalistic theories and led some authors to abandon the concept of dysfunction, favoring instead definitions based in normative criteria or phenomenological approaches. Although this work has enhanced our understanding of disease and illness, we need not necessarily abandon naturalistic concepts of function and dysfunction in the disease debate. This article attempts to move towards a new naturalistic theory of disease that overcomes the limitations of previous definitions and offers advantages in the clinical setting. Our approach involves a reevaluation of concepts of biological function employed by naturalistic theories. Drawing on recent insights from the philosophy of biology, we develop a contextual and evaluative account of function that is better suited to clinical medicine and remains consistent with contemporary naturalism. We also show how an updated naturalistic view shares important affinities with normativist and phenomenological positions, suggesting a possibility for consilience in the disease debate.
Keywords BIOETHICS  BIOLOGY  CLINICAL MEDICINE  DEFINITION  DISEASE  ETHICS  FUNCTION  NATURALISM  NORMATIVISM  PHENOMENOLOGY
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Should Phenomenological Approaches to Illness Be Wary of Naturalism?Juliette Ferry-Danini - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 73:10-18.
Understanding Disease and Illness.Jeremy R. Simon, Havi Carel & Alexander Bird - 2017 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 38 (4):239-244.

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