Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):563 – 582 (2008)

Authors
Mazviita Chirimuuta
University of Pittsburgh
Abstract
Reflectance realism is an important position in the philosophy of colour. This paper is an examination of David R. Hilbert’s case for there being scientific support for the theory. The specific point in question is whether colour science has shown that reflectance is recovered by the human visual system. Following a discussion of possible counter-evidence in the recent scientific literature, I make the argument that conflicting interpretations of the data on reflectance recovery are informed by different theoretical assumptions about the nature of
colour, and of perception. If this is so, there cannot be neutral empirical
evidence on this point, and this does seem to undermine Hilbert’s claim for
empirical support. In the end, I suggest alternative ways of thinking about the relationship between colour ontology and empirical work on colour.
Keywords Colour  Philosophy of Cognitive Science  Philosophy of Perception  Philosophy of Neuroscience
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802215364
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References found in this work BETA

Naming the Colours.David Lewis - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):325-42.
Berkeley's Revolution in Vision.Margaret Atherton - 1990 - Cornell University Press.
Does Colour Constancy Exist?David H. Foster - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (10):439-443.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Colour Vision and Seeing Colours.Will Davies - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (3):657-690.
Colour Vision and Seeing Colours.Will Davies - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw026.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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