Philosophical Investigations 32 (4):329-337 (2009)

William Child
Oxford University
I have argued that Wittgenstein's treatment of dreaming involves a kind of anti-realism about the past: what makes "I dreamed p " true is, roughly, that I wake with the feeling or impression of having dreamed p . Richard Scheer raises three objections. First, that the texts do not support my interpretation. Second, that the anti-realist view of dreaming does not make sense, so cannot be Wittgenstein's view. Third, that the anti-realist view leaves it a mystery why someone who reports having dreamed such-and-such is inclined to report what she does. The Reply defends my reading of Wittgenstein against these objections
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2009.01386.x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 54,536
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Was Wittgenstein an Anti-Realist?Richard Scheer - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (4):319-328.
Ruling-Out Realism.Peter Carruthers - 1985 - Philosophia 15 (1-2):61-78.
The Conditions of Realism.Christian Miller - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:95-132.
Making Up the Truth.Steven L. Reynolds - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):315-335.
What is Wrong with Husserl's Scientific Anti-Realism?Harald A. Wiltsche - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (2):105-130.


Added to PP index

Total views
79 ( #122,477 of 2,385,598 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #560,835 of 2,385,598 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes