Erkenntnis 67 (1):1-16 (2007)

Authors
Sungho Choi
Kyung Hee University
Abstract
Recently Stephen Barker has raised stimulating objections to the thesis that, roughly speaking, if two events stand in a relation of counterfactual dependence, they stand in a causal relation. As Ned Hall says, however, this thesis constitutes the strongest part of the counterfactual analysis of causation. Therefore, if successful, Barker’s objections will undermine the cornerstone of the counterfactual analysis of causation, and hence give us compelling reasons to reject the counterfactual analysis of causation. I will argue, however, that they do not withstand scrutiny.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Ethics   Ontology   Epistemology   Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-006-9000-7
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References found in this work BETA

Asymmetries in Time.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Noûs 24 (5):804-806.
Causation and the Price of Transitivity.Ned Hall - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):198.

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Citations of this work BETA

Backward Causation.Jan Faye - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Dispositions.James M. Bucknell - 2015 - Dissertation, Univeristy of New South Wales

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