British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (6):1075-1096 (2016)
Abstract |
There is debate over whether the content of an intuitive cognition is determined externally or internally in Ockham’s theory. According to the most common view, which I call the Strong Externalist Interpretation, intuitive content is wholly determined externally. Opposed to SE is the Strong Internalist Interpretation, according to which the content of an intuition is wholly determined by internal features of a cognizer. The aim of this paper is to argue against those interpretations, and to argue for a third kind of interpretation which preserves interpretative advantages of SE and SI without falling into the difficulties that each faces. On this view, intuitive content is complex, and its complexity is analyzed into a mix of internalist and externalist elements.
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DOI | 10.1080/09608788.2016.1192022 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.
Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content.Jeff Speaks - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.
The Representationalism Versus Relationalism Debate: Explanatory Contextualism About Perception.Bence Nanay - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):321-336.
The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience.Michael Tye - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):541-562.
Intuition, Externalism, and Direct Reference in Ockham.Susan Brower-Toland - 2007 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (4):317-336.
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Citations of this work BETA
Causation and Mental Content: Against the Externalist Interpretation of Ockham.Susan Brower-Toland - 2017 - In Magali Elise Roques & Jenny Pelletier (eds.), The Language of Thought in Late Medieval Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Claude Panaccio.
Medieval Vs Contemporary Metaphysics and Logic of Intentionality.Andrzej Bułeczka - 2017 - Dissertation,
Can We Reflexively Access the Contents of Our Own Perceptions? Ockham on the Reflexive Cognition of the Contents of Intuitions.Lydia Deni Gamboa - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (5):921-940.
The Double Intentionality of Moral Intentional Actions: Scotus and Ockham on Interior and Exterior Acts.Sonja Schierbaum - forthcoming - Topoi:1-11.
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