Philosophy of Science 85 (4):704-725 (2018)

Authors
Christopher ChoGlueck
New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology
Abstract
Kevin Elliott and others separate two common arguments for the legitimacy of societal values in scientific reasoning as the gap and the error arguments. This article poses two questions: How are these two arguments related, and what can we learn from their interrelation? I contend that we can better understand the error argument as nested within the gap because the error is a limited case of the gap with narrower features. Furthermore, this nestedness provides philosophers with conceptual tools for analyzing more robustly how values pervade science.
Keywords underdetermination  inductive risk  values in science
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Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1086/699191
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Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?Sandra Harding - 1991 - Cornell University Press.

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