Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (1):22-25 (2019)
AbstractIn ‘Why Abortion is Immoral’, Don Marquis argues that abortion is wrong for the same reason that murder is wrong, namely, that it deprives a human being of an FLO, a ‘future like ours,’ which is a future full of value and the experience of life. Marquis’ argument rests on the assumption that the human being is somehow deprived by suffering an early death. I argue that Marquis’ argument faces the ‘Epicurean Challenge’. The concept of ‘deprivation’ requires that some discernible individual exists who can be deprived. But if death involves total annihilation, then no discernible individual exists to be so deprived. I argue that the Epicurean Challenge must be addressed before it can be proven that Marquis is correct to claim that abortion and murder are wrong because they deprive someone of an FLO.
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Citations of this work
Meeting the Epicurean Challenge: A Reply to ’Abortion and Deprivation'.Nick Colgrove - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (6):380-383.
Meeting the Epicurean Challenge: A Reply to Christensen.Bruce P. Blackshaw & Daniel Rodger - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (7):478-479.
On the Margins: Personhood and Moral Status in Marginal Cases of Human Rights.Helen Ryland - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Birmingham
Murder, Abortion, Contraception, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Deprivation of Non-Discernible and Non-Existent People: A Reply to Marquis and Christensen.Hugh V. McLachlan - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (6):415-416.
Abortion and the Epicurean Challenge.Karl Ekendahl - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (4):273-274.
References found in this work
How to Be Dead and Not Care: A Defense of Epicurus.Stephen E. Rosenbaum - 1986 - American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (2):217 - 225.