Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2191-2214 (2021)

Authors
David Christensen
Brown University
Abstract
Abstract: Theories of epistemic rationality that take disagreement (or other higher-order evidence) seriously tend to be “modest” in a certain sense: they say that there are circumstances in which it is rational to doubt their correctness. Modest views have been criticized on the grounds that they undermine themselves—they’re self-defeating. The standard Self-Defeat Objections depend on principles forbidding epistemically akratic beliefs; but there are good reasons to doubt these principles—even New Rational Reflection, which was designed to allow for certain special cases that are intuitively akratic. On the other hand, if we construct a Self-Defeat Objection without relying on anti-akratic principles, modest principles turn out not to undermine themselves. In the end, modesty should not be seen as a defect in a theory of rational belief.
Keywords epistemic rationality  epistemology of disagreement  Higher-order evidence  epistemic rationality  Self-undermining  conciliationism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-020-01536-6
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References found in this work BETA

The Epistemic Role of Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.

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