Constructivism, Expressivism and Ethical Knowledge


Authors
Matthew Chrisman
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
In the contemporary metaethical debate, expressivist (Blackburn, Gibbard) and constructivist (Korsgaard, Street) views can be viewed as inspired by irrealist ideas from Hume and Kant respectively. One realist response to these contemporary irrealist views is to argue that they are inconsistent with obvious surface-level appearances of ordinary ethical thought and discourse, especially the fact that we talk and act as if there is ethical knowledge . In this paper, I explore some constructivist and expressivist options for responding to this objection. My conclusion is that, although both constructivists and expressivists can capture other surface-level features of ethical thought and discourse, the possibility of ethical knowledge causes special problems for these versions of irrealism. I end with some comments about where I think irrealists should begin to look for a response to these special problems, which points, somewhat surprisingly, towards an alternative inferentialist form of irrealism about epistemic and ethical thought and discourse, which is inspired by Sellars
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DOI 10.1080/09672559.2010.492119
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References found in this work BETA

Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.
Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.
Resolute Expressivism.Nicholas Smyth - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):1-12.
Epistemological Motivations for Anti-Realism.Billy Dunaway - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2763-2789.

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