Analysis 52 (3):163-8 (1992)

Authors
David Christensen
Brown University
Abstract
In "A Modal Argument for Narrow Content" ("Journal of Philosophy", LXXXVIII, 1991, pp 5-26), Jerry Fodor proposes a necessary condition for the distinctness of causal powers. He uses this condition to support psychological individualism. I show that Fodor's argument relies on inconsistent interpretations of his condition on distinct causal powers. Moreover, on no consistent interpretation does Fodor's condition yield the results claimed for it
Keywords Causality  Concept  Connection  Power  Science  Fodor, J
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DOI 10.1093/analys/52.3.163
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