Philosophia 44 (2):447-467 (2016)

Authors
Dionysis Christias
University of Patras
Abstract
In this paper, first, I will focus on the divergent interpretations of two leading Sellars’ scholars, Willem deVries and James O’Shea, as regards Sellars’ view on the being of the normative. It will be suggested that this conflict between deVries’ and O’Shea’s viewpoints can be resolved by the provision of an account of what I shall call ‘ready-tohand’ normativity, which incorporates the insights of both deVries’ and O’Shea’s interpretive perspectives, while at the same time going beyond them. It shall be further argued that the resulting ‘phenomenologically’ informed view of normativity, pointing as it does towards its ideal integration not only with practical action but also with perceptual experience, in the form of what I shall call ‘kinaesthetic’ normativity, can potentially pose problems to Sellars’ own view on the matter, and, in particular, to the way normativity can allegedly be ‘stereoscopically fused’ with the ultimate ontology of the ideal scientific image. However, I shall argue that these problems are not unsurpassable: although the possibility of a specifically ‘kinaesthetic’ form of normativity seems to have eluded Sellars’ grasp, his views about the way in which the productive imagination is implicated in perceptual experience, do indeed provide the conceptual resources that make possible the stereoscopic fusion of this kind of normativity with the ontology of the ideal scientific image
Keywords ‘Ready-to-hand’ normativity  Kinaesthetic normativity  Scientific image  Productive  Imagination  Sellars  deVries  O’Shea
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-016-9691-1
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References found in this work BETA

Do We See Apples as Edible?Bence Nanay - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):305-322.
Phenomenology of Perception.Mary Warnock - 1964 - Philosophical Quarterly 14 (57):372-375.
Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?Alva Noë - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):1-12.
Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty.Sean D. Kelly - 2005 - In Taylor Carman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 74-110.

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