Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy

Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767 (2009)
Abstract
How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others – perhaps 'epistemic peers' who seem as well-qualified as you are – hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that principle, and on the wider issue. It ends by describing some outstanding questions that thinking about this issue raises.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x
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References found in this work BETA
Change in View.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - MIT Press.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.

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Citations of this work BETA
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
You Just Believe That Because….Roger White - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.

View all 47 citations / Add more citations

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Who is an Epistemic Peer?Axel Gelfert - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):507-514.

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