Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767 (2009)
How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others – perhaps 'epistemic peers' who seem as well-qualified as you are – hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that principle, and on the wider issue. It ends by describing some outstanding questions that thinking about this issue raises.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Disagreement, Question-Begging, and Epistemic Self-Criticism.David Christensen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11 (6).
Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.
Citations of this work BETA
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Jack Lyons - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.
When is Consensus Knowledge Based? Distinguishing Shared Knowledge From Mere Agreement.Boaz Miller - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1293-1316.
Similar books and articles
The Epistemology of Disagreement.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.
'Partial Defeaters' and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Michael Thune - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):355-372.
Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Jonathan Matheson - 2009 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 6 (3):269-279.
Religious Belief and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Michael Thune - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (8):712-724.
Moral Intuitions, Reliability and Disagreement.David Killoren - 2010 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-35.
Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):294-312.
Added to index2009-08-27
Total downloads773 ( #1,215 of 2,168,923 )
Recent downloads (6 months)47 ( #5,099 of 2,168,923 )
How can I increase my downloads?