Does murphy’s law apply in epistemology


Authors
David Christensen
Brown University
Abstract
Formally-inclined epistemologists often theorize about ideally rational agents--agents who exemplify rational ideals, such as probabilistic coherence, that human beings could never fully realize. This approach can be defended against the well-know worry that abstracting from human cognitive imperfections deprives the approach of interest. But a different worry arises when we ask what an ideal agent should believe about her own cognitive perfection (even an agent who is in fact cognitively perfect might, it would seem, be uncertain of this fact). Consideration of this question reveals an interesting feature of the structure of our epistemic ideals: for agents with limited information, our epistemic ideals turn out to conflict with one another.
Keywords probabilism  ideal agent  rationality  coherence  formal constraints  self-doubt  conflicting ideals
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 47,149
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Behaviorism 17 (2):161-164.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.

View all 52 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Coherence as an Ideal of Rationality.Lyle Zynda - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):175 - 216.
Ideal Rationality and Hand Waving.Reed Richter - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):147 – 156.
The Concept of Ideals in Legal Theory.Sanne Taekema - 2003 - Kluwer Law International.
Why the Angels Cannot Choose.J. McKenzie Alexander - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):619 - 640.
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
Feasible Inferences.Christopher Cherniak - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (2):248-268.
Moral Rules, Moral Ideals, and Use-Inspired Research.Jeffrey Kovac - 2007 - Science and Engineering Ethics 13 (2):159-169.
Philip Selznick: Ideals in the World.Martin Krygier - 2012 - Stanford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-03-20

Total views
167 ( #49,113 of 2,289,437 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #41,190 of 2,289,437 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature