Epistemology of disagreement: The good news

Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217 (2007)
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Abstract

How should one react when one has a belief, but knows that other people—who have roughly the same evidence as one has, and seem roughly as likely to react to it correctly—disagree? This paper argues that the disagreement of other competent inquirers often requires one to be much less confident in one’s opinions than one would otherwise be.

Other Versions

reprint Christensen, David (2018) "Epistemology of disagreement : the good news". In Fantl, Jeremy, McGrath, Matthew, Sosa, Ernest, Contemporary epistemology: an anthology, pp. : Wiley (2018)

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David Christensen
Brown University

Citations of this work

Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb, Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.
Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185–215.

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