Higher-Order Evidence

Abstract
Sometimes we get evidence of our own epistemic malfunction. This can come from finding out we’re fatigued, or have been drugged, or that other competent and well-informed thinkers disagree with our beliefs. This sort of evidence seems to seems to behave differently from ordinary evidence about the world. In particular, getting such evidence can put agents in a position where the most rational response involves violating some epistemic ideal
Keywords defeat  disagreement  higher-order doubts or evidence  evidence  self-doubt  rationality  rational belief  epistemic akrasia
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00366.x
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References found in this work BETA
Richard Feldman (2006). Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement. In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.
Thomas Kelly (2005). The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.

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Citations of this work BETA
Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio (2014). Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Roger White (2010). You Just Believe That Because…. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.

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