Predictivism asserts that novel confirmations carry special probative weight. Epistemic pluralism asserts that the judgments of agents (about, e.g., the probabilities of theories) carry epistemic import. In this paper, I propose a new theory of predictivism that is tailored to pluralistic evaluators of theories. I replace the orthodox notion of use-novelty with a notion of endorsement-novelty, and argue that the intuition that predictivism is true has two roots. I provide a detailed Bayesian rendering of this theory and argue that pluralistic theory evaluation pervades scientific practice. I compare my account of predictivism with those of Maher and Worrall. Introduction Why construction is a red herring for pluralist evaluators The unvirtuous accommodator Virtuous endorsers and the two roots of predictivism The two roots in Bayesian terms: the priors and background beliefs of endorsers Who are the pluralist evaluators? Two contemporary theories of predictivism 7.1 Maher: Reliable methods of theory construction 7.2 Worrall: The confirmation of core ideas Conclusion.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axi131
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
On the Predilections for Predictions.David Harker - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):429-453.
The Big Test of Corroboration.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):293 – 302.

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