Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief

Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2004)

Abstract

What role, if any, does formal logic play in characterizing epistemically rational belief? Traditionally, belief is seen in a binary way - either one believes a proposition, or one doesn't. Given this picture, it is attractive to impose certain deductive constraints on rational belief: that one's beliefs be logically consistent, and that one believe the logical consequences of one's beliefs. A less popular picture sees belief as a graded phenomenon.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,856

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
220 (#53,481)

6 months
8 (#90,149)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Christensen
Brown University

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Similar books and articles

Belief-in Revisited: A Reply to Williams.J. J. Macintosh - 1994 - Religious Studies 30 (4):487 - 503.
The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief.James Hawthorne - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library: Springer. pp. 49--74.
Rational Belief Systems.Brian David Ellis - 1979 - Totowa, NJ, USA: Rowman & Littlefield.
What is the Normative Role of Logic?Peter Milne - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.
Common Belief with the Logic of Individual Belief.Giacomo Bonanno - 2000 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 46 (1):49-52.
Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework.Giacomo Bonanno - 2008 - In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press.