Rationality for the Self-Aware (Ernest Sosa Lecture)

Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 95:215-236 (2021)
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This lecture illustrates some of the theoretical richness that emerges from thinking about self-aware agents. It argues that taking self-awareness into account yields a picture of rational belief that is surprising, in a number of different, but interconnected, ways. The complexities it focuses on emerge most clearly in cases that involve so-called “higher-order evidence.”



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David Christensen
Brown University

Citations of this work

Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
Normative Externalism.Brian Weatherson - 2019 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.

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