Authors
Dionysis Christias
University of Patras
Abstract
In a recent article Sachs suggests that the concept of somatic intentionality is the key to understanding how the conceptual order is externally constrained by something outside itself which is nonetheless fully intentional in nature. Sachs claims that his proposal fares better than Sellars’ view on the issue of how our experience can so much as be about objective reality. In this paper, I shall argue that this is not the case because Sellars’ view is in crucial respects misdescribed. Sachs suggests that Sellars’ view is problematic because 1) conceptual intentionality cannot objectively constrain the conceptual order due to its essential discursive form, and 2) a non-intentional consciousness cannot provide an objective worldly constraint on conceptual intentionality because it is not world-directed. However neither of these points succeeds in capturing Sellars’ actual position. Further I will suggest the deepest problem which phenomenological views of a Merleau-Pontyan stripe face in the..
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1080/09672559.2015.1016995
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,688
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John Mcdowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit From the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 2005 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (2):47 - 65.

View all 25 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Sellars's Synoptic Vision.Dionysis Christias - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):135-163.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Discursive and Somatic Intentionality: Merleau-Ponty Contra 'McDowell or Sellars'.Carl B. Sachs - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (2):199-227.
Intentionality and Normativity.Uriah Kriegel - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.
Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider.Rasmus Thybo Jensen - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):371-388.
Making Room for Bodily Intentionality.Todd D. Janke - 2008 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):51-68.
Intentionality: Transparent, Translucent, and Opaque.Pierre Le Morvan - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:283-302.
The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality.Nicholas Georgalis - 2003 - Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-03-13

Total views
31 ( #319,594 of 2,349,559 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #510,673 of 2,349,559 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes