The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth: Reflections on Rosenberg

In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 357-382 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper considers an argument from Rosenberg (Thinking about Knowing, 2002) that truth is not and cannot be the aim of belief. Here, I reconstruct what I take to be the most well worked out version of this idea tracing back to Rorty and Davidson. In response, I also distinguish two things the truth-aim could be: a goal regulating our executable epistemic conduct and an end which determines the types of evaluation, susceptibility to which is partially constitutive of what a belief is.

Other Versions

original Chrisman, Matthew (2016) "The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth: Reflections on Rosenberg". In Grajner, Martin, Schmechtig, Pedro, Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals, pp. 357-382: De Gruyter (2016)

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth.Matthew Chrisman - 2010 - In James R. O'Shea & Eric M. Rubenstein (eds.), Self, Language, and World: Problems from Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg. Ridgeview Publishing Co..
Belief, truth and virtue.Michael-John Turp - 2013 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):91-104.
Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
Truth and the Aim of Epistemic Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2003 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):83-91.
Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.
The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
Epistemic freedom revisited.Gregory Antill - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):793-815.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-10-29

Downloads
685 (#31,481)

6 months
139 (#31,400)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Matthew Chrisman
University of Edinburgh

References found in this work

The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by J. David Velleman.
The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.

View all 31 references / Add more references