Philosophy of Science 57 (4):644-662 (1990)

Authors
David Christensen
Brown University
Abstract
The main appeal of the currently popular "bootstrap" account of confirmation developed by Clark Glymour is that it seems to provide an account of evidential relevance. This account has, however, had severe problems; and Glymour has revised his original account in an attempt to solve them. I argue that this attempt fails completely, and that any similar modifications must also fail. If the problems can be solved, it will only be by radical revisions which involve jettisoning bootstrapping's basic approach to theories. Finally, I argue that there is little reason to think that even such drastic modifications will lead to a satisfactory account of relevance
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DOI 10.1086/289584
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Bootstrapping and Content Parts.Ken Gemes - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (3):345-370.
Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses as Relations.Aysel Dogan - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):243 - 259.
Kant’s Cognitive Semantics, Newton’s Rule Four of Philosophy and Scientific Realism.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2011 - Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 63 (1-2):27-49.
Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses as Relations.Aysel Dogan - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):243-259.

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