Testimony, memory and the limits of the a priori

Philosophical Studies 86 (1):1-20 (1997)
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Abstract

A number of philosophers, from Thomas Reid1 through C. A. J. Coady2, have argued that one is justified in relying on the testimony of others, and furthermore, that this should be taken as a basic epistemic presumption. If such a general presumption were not ultimately dependent on evidence for the reliability of other people, the ground for this presumption would be a priori. Such a presumption would then have a status like that which Roderick Chisholm claims for the epistemic principle that we are justified in believing what our senses tell us.

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Author Profiles

Hilary Kornblith
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
David Christensen
Brown University

Citations of this work

Epistemological problems of testimony.Jonathan E. Adler - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Is Memory Merely Testimony from One's Former Self?David James Barnett - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):353-392.
Is there a priori knowledge by testimony?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):199-241.
Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of what is Said.Andrew Peet - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):65-81.

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