Philosophy of Science 66 (3):249 (1999)

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Abstract
Donald Campbell has long advocated a naturalist epistemology based on a general selection theory, with the scope of knowledge restricted to vicarious adaptive processes. But being a vicariant is problematic because it involves an unexplained epistemic relation. We argue that this relation is to be explicated organizationally in terms of the regulation of behavior and internal state by the vicariant, but that Campbell's selectionist approach can give no satisfactory account of it because it is opaque to organization. We show how organizational constraints and capacities are crucial to understanding both evolution and cognition and conclude with a proposal for an enriched, generalized model of evolutionary epistemology that places high-order regulatory organization at the center
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DOI 10.1086/392728
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Reconsidering Cultural Selection Theory.G. K. D. Crozier - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):455-479.

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