Virtue Ethics, Value-centredness, and Consequentialism

Utilitas 13 (2):213 (2001)
This paper argues against two major features of consequentialist conceptions of virtue: Value-centredness and the Hegemony of Promotion as a mode of moral acknowledgement or responsiveness. In relation to the first feature, I argue against two ideas: Value should be understood entirely independently of virtue; and The only right-making respects which serve to make an action better than another is degree of value. I argue that what I call the bases of moral response are several, including also status, the good for, and bonds. Against the Hegemony of Promotion thesis I argue for several modes of moral responsiveness constitutive of virtue
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0953820800003149
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,411
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

70 ( #69,581 of 1,924,732 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

24 ( #20,382 of 1,924,732 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.