Noûs 31 (3):370-384 (1997)

Authors
David Christensen
Brown University
Abstract
It is commonly acknowledged that, in order to test a theoretical hypothesis, one must, in Duhem' s phrase, rely on a "theoretical scaffolding" to connect the hypothesis with something measurable. Hypothesis-confirmation, on this view, becomes a three-place relation: evidence E will confirm hypothesis H only relative to some such scaffolding B. Thus the two leading logical approaches to qualitative confirmation--the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) account and Clark Glymour' s bootstrap account--analyze confirmation in relative terms. But this raises questions about the philosophical interpretation of the technical conditions these accounts describe. What does it mean to say that E confirms H "relative to B"? How should we interpret the relation we are trying to analyze?
Keywords evidence  holism  Glymour  bootstrap  hypothetico-deductivism
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DOI 10.1111/0029-4624.00050
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References found in this work BETA

Bayes or Bust?John Earman - 1992 - Bradford.
Glymour on Evidential Relevance.David Christensen - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (3):471-481.
The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping.David Christensen - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (4):644-662.

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Citations of this work BETA

What Evidence Do You Have?Ram Neta - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):89-119.
Proper Bootstrapping.Igor2 Douven & Christoph9 Kelp - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):171-185.
Bootstrapping and Content Parts.Ken Gemes - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (3):345-370.

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