What might dynamical intentionality be, if not computation?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):634-635 (1998)
(1) Van Gelder's concession that the dynamical hypothesis is not in opposition to computation in general does not agree well with his anticomputational stance. (2) There are problems with the claim that dynamic systems allow for nonrepresentational aspects of computation in a way in which digital computation cannot. (3) There are two senses of the “cognition is computation” claim and van Gelder argues against only one of them. (4) Dynamical systems as characterized in the target article share problems of universal realizability with formal notions of computation, but differ in that there is no solution available for them. (5) The dynamical hypothesis cannot tell us what cognition is, because instantiating a particular dynamical system is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a cognitive agent.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X98281738
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