In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 174 (2013)
Phenomenal holism is the thesis that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are parts of certain wholes. The first aim of this paper is to defend phenomenal holism. I argue, moreover, that there are complex intellectual experiences (intellectual gestalts)—such as experiences of grasping a proof—whose parts instantiate holistic phenomenal characters. Proponents of cognitive phenomenology believe that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are not purely sensory. The second aim of this paper is to defend cognitive phenomenology. I argue that reflection on intellectual gestalts provides a basis for developing a case for cognitive phenomenology that is immune to many of the worries that beset more familiar arguments for cognitive phenomenology.
|Keywords||phenomenal holism cognitive phenomenology gestalt|
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Citations of this work BETA
The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1).
Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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