Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378 (2013)
In this paper I assume that we have some intuitive knowledge—i.e. beliefs that amount to knowledge because they are based on intuitions. The question I take up is this: given that some intuition makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? We can ask a similar question about perception. That is: given that some perception makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? A natural idea about perception is that a perception makes a belief amount to knowledge in part by making you sensorily aware of the concrete objects it is about. The analogous idea about intuition is that an intuition makes a belief amount to knowledge in part by making you intellectually aware of the abstract objects it is about. I expand both ideas into fuller accounts of perceptual and intuitive knowledge, explain the main challenge to this sort of account of intuitive knowledge (i.e. the challenge of making sense of intellectual awareness), and develop a response to it.
|Keywords||intuition perception knowledge epistemology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake?Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):183-197.
Is Intuition Based On Understanding?Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):42-67.
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