Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):277 – 306 (2007)

Authors
Philippe Chuard
Southern Methodist University
Abstract
Conceptualists have it that the representational content of perceptual experience is determined by the concepts a subject applies in having such an experience. Conceptualists like Bill Brewer [1999] and John McDowell [1994] have laid particular emphasis on demonstrative concepts in trying to account for the fact that subjects can perceive and discriminate very many specific shades of colour in experience. Against this, it has been objected that such demonstrative concepts have incoherent conditions of extension and/or of individuation, due to the fact that chromatic indiscriminability is non-transitive. In this paper, I consider three different versions of this objection and show why each fails.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400701343143
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Sorites Paradox.Dominic Hyde - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Transitivity of Visual Sameness.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2695-2719.
Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Continua.Diana Raffman - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):309-322.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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