Is 'thinker' a natural kind?

Dialogue 21 (June):223-38 (1982)
Abstract
Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is here criticized from the perspective of a more naturalistic and less compromising form of materialism. Parallels are explored between the problem of cognitive activity and the somewhat more settled problem of vital activity. The lessons drawn suggest that functionalism in the philosophy of mind may be both counterproductive as a research strategy, and false as a substantive position
Keywords Biology  Cognition  Functionalism  Metaphysics  Thinking
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DOI 10.1017/S001221730001636X
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References found in this work BETA
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
Science, Perception, and Reality.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - New York: Humanities Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Right Stuff.J. Christopher Maloney - 1987 - Synthese 70 (March):349-72.
About Being a Bat.J. Christopher Maloney - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (March):26-49.

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