On the alleged backward referral of experience and its relevance to the mind-body problem

Philosophy of Science 48 (June):165-81 (1981)
Abstract
A remarkable hypothesis has recently been advanced by Libet and promoted by Eccles which claims that there is standardly a backwards referral of conscious experiences in time, and that this constitutes empirical evidence for the failure of identity of brain states and mental states. Libet's neurophysiological data are critically examined and are found insufficient to support the hypothesis. Additionally, it is argued that even if there is a temporal displacement phenomenon to be explained, a neurophysiological explanation is most likely
Keywords Body  Experience  Metaphysics  Mind  Libet, B
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DOI 10.1086/288989
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Begging the Question Against Phenomenal Consciousness.Ned Block - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):205-206.
The Where in the Brain Determines the When in the Mind.M. Jeannerod - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):212-213.

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