Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology

Authors
Elijah Chudnoff
University of Miami
Abstract
According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson's Jack/Jacques argument—hypothetical—represented by Kriegel's Zoe argument—and glossed—first developed here. I argue that pure and hypothetical phenomenal contrast arguments face significant difficulties, but that there is a sound glossed phenomenal contrast argument for irreducible cognitive phenomenology
Keywords phenomenal contrast  cognitive phenomenology  conscious thought
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DOI 10.1111/phpr.12177
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References found in this work BETA

The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
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Citations of this work BETA

Recent Issues in High-Level Perception.Grace Helton - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862.
Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Modal Epistemology Made Concrete.Daniel Dohrn - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
On the Limits of the Method of Phenomenal Contrast.Martina Fürst - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):168-188.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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