Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor

Philosophy of Science 55 (June):167-87 (1988)
Abstract
The doctrine that the character of our perceptual knowledge is plastic, and can vary substantially with the theories embraced by the perceiver, has been criticized in a recent paper by Fodor. His arguments are based on certain experimental facts and theoretical approaches in cognitive psychology. My aim in this paper is threefold: to show that Fodor's views on the impenetrability of perceptual processing do not secure a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge; to show that his views on impenetrability are almost certainly false; and to provide some additional arguments for, and illustrations of, the theoretical character of all observation judgments
Keywords Cognition  Epistemology  Neutrality  Perception  Plasticity  Science
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DOI 10.1086/289425
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