The Doxastic Account of Intellectual Humility

Logos and Episteme 7 (4):413-433 (2016)
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Abstract

This paper will be broken down into four sections. In §1, I try to assuage a worry that intellectual humility is not really an intellectual virtue. In §2, we will consider the two dominant accounts of intellectual humility in the philosophical literature—the low concern for status account the limitations-owing account—and I will argue that both accounts face serious worries. Then in §3, I will unpack my own view, the doxastic account of intellectual humility, as a viable alternative and potentially a better starting place for thinking about this virtue. And I’ll conclude in §4 by trying to defend the doxastic account against some possible objections.

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Ian M. Church
Hillsdale College

Citations of this work

Does Epistemic Humility Threaten Religious Beliefs?Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Journal of Psychology and Theology 46 (4):292– 304.
Educating for Intellectual Humility and Conviction.Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (2):398-409.

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