Philosophers' Imprint 11 (11) (2011)
The paper develops an objection to the extensional model of time consciousness—the view that temporally extended events or processes, and their temporal properties, can be directly perceived as such. Importantly, following James, advocates of the extensional model typically insist that whole experiences of temporal relations between non-simultaneous events are distinct from mere successions of their temporal parts. This means, presumably, that there ought to be some feature(s) differentiating the former from the latter. I try to show why the extensional models offers no credible ground for positing such a difference
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Silencing the Experience of Change.Sebastian Watzl - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1009-1032.
Temporal Experience: Models, Methodology and Empirical Evidence.Maria Kon & Kristie Miller - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):201-216.
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