Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):535-549 (2015)

Authors
Elijah Chudnoff
University of Miami
David DiDomenico
University of Miami
Abstract
Dogmatists and phenomenal conservatives think that if it perceptually seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. Increasingly, writers about these views have argued that perceptual seemings are composed of two other states: a sensation followed by a seeming. In this article we critically examine this movement. First we argue that there are no compelling reasons to think of perceptual seemings as so composed. Second we argue that even if they were so composed, this underlying disunity in metaphysical or psychological structure would fall below the threshold of epistemic significance
Keywords Perceptual Experience  Perceptual Justification  Phenomenal Conservatism  Seemings
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12114
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.

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Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Experience and Cognitive Penetrability.Somogy Varga - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):376-397.
Epistemological Problems of Perception.Jack Lyons - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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