The reality of the intuitive


Authors
Elijah Chudnoff
University of Miami
Abstract
According to current methodological orthodoxy philosophers rely on intuitions about thought experiments to refute general claims about the nature of knowledge, freedom, thought, reference, justice, beauty, etc. Philosophers working under the banner of ‘negative experimental philosophy’ have criticized more traditional philosophers for relying on this method. They argue that intuitions about thought experiments are influenced by factors that are irrelevant to the truth of their contents. Cappelen and Deutsch defend traditional philosophy against this critique by rejecting the picture of philosophical methodology it presupposes: philosophers do not really rely on intuitions. In this paper, I defend methodological orthodoxy by arguing that philosophers must rely on intuitions somewhere and that they do in fact often rely on intuitions about thought experiments. I also argue in favor of a reply to the negative experimental critique that is similar to at least part of Deutsch’s own.
Keywords intuition  centrality  philosophical methodology  negative experimental philosophy
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Reprint years 2017
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DOI 10.1080/0020174X.2016.1220640
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How Philosophers Use Intuition and 'Intuition'.John Bengson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):555-576.
Aesthetic Concepts.Frank Sibley - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (4):421-450.
Reasoning: A Social Picture. By Anthony Simon Laden.Adam Morton - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):843-846.
Philosophy Without Intuitions. By Herman Cappelen.Kristoffer Ahlstrom‐Vij - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):821-823.
Consciousness and The Prospects of Physicalism. By Derk Pereboom.Sam Coleman - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):824-827.

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