Mind 119 (474):409-422 (2010)
AbstractConservativeness has been proposed as an important requirement for deflationary truth theories. This in turn gave rise to the so-called ‘conservativeness argument’ against deflationism: a theory of truth which is conservative over its base theory S cannot be adequate, because it cannot prove that all theorems of S are true. In this paper we show that the problems confronting the deflationist are in fact more basic: even the observation that logic is true is beyond his reach. This seems to conflict with the deflationary characterization of the role of the truth predicate in proving generalizations. However, in the final section we propose a way out for the deflationist — a solution that permits him to accept a strong theory, having important truth-theoretical generalizations as its theorems
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Citations of this work
The Function of Truth and the Conservativeness Argument.Kentaro Fujimoto - 2022 - Mind 131 (521):129-157.
References found in this work
Proof and Truth: Through Thick and Thin.Stewart Shapiro - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (10):493-521.