Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421 (2005)
: On a standard libertarian account of free will, an agent acts freely on some occasion only if there remains, until the action is performed, some chance that the agent will do something else instead right then. These views face the objection that, in such a case, it is a matter of luck whether the agent does one thing or another. This paper considers the problem of luck as it bears on agent‐causal libertarian accounts. A view of this type is defended against a recent and challenging version of the argument from luck
|Keywords||Agency Causation Epistemology Free Will Luck|
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References found in this work BETA
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory.Myles Brand - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):49-54.
Citations of this work BETA
Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2012 - Noûs 46 (2):326-354.
Cross-World Luck at the Time of Decision is a Problem for Compatibilists as Well.Mirja Pérez de Calleja - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):112-125.
Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck. [REVIEW]Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):753-770.
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