Philosophy of Science 87 (1):91-112 (2020)

Authors
Hayley Clatterbuck
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Abstract
I evaluate the plausibility of explanatory elitism, the view that a good scientific explanation of an outcome will show that it was highly probable. I consider an argument from Michael Strevens that elitism is the only view that can account for the historical acceptance of probabilistic theories in physics. I argue that biology provides better test cases for evaluating elitism and conclude that theories in that domain were favored in virtue of conferring correct, and not necessarily high, probabilities on outcomes.
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DOI 10.1086/706082
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