Autonomous reasons for intending

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):191 – 212 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

An autonomous reason for intending to A would be a reason for so intending that is not, and will not be, a reason for A-ing. Some puzzle cases, such as the one that figures in the toxin puzzle, suggest that there can be such reasons for intending, but these cases have special features that cloud the issue. This paper describes cases that more clearly favour the view that we can have practical reasons of this sort. Several objections to this view are considered and rejected. Finally, it is considered whether the existence of such reasons would conflict with an attractive coherence principle linking the rationality of intending with that of acting as intended. The paper concludes with a qualified affirmation of autonomous reasons for intending.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,726

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Reasons and impossibility.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246.
Reasons to Intend.Ulrike Heuer - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 865-890.
Intending, foreseeing, and the state.David Enoch - 2007 - Legal Theory 13 (2):69-99.
A Stronger Doctrine of Double Effect.Ben Bronner & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):793-805.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
150 (#128,287)

6 months
21 (#164,900)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Randolph Clarke
Florida State University

Citations of this work

Reasons Explanation: Further Defense of a Non-causal Account.Carl Ginet - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):219-228.
The Source of Responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2023 - Ethics 133 (2):163–188.
Reasons, intentions, and actions.Randolph Clarke - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (6).
Because She Wanted To.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27-35.
Diachronic agency and practical entitlement.Matthew Heeney - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):177-198.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

View all 51 references / Add more references