Authors
Brendan Clarke
University College London
Abstract
In this article, I begin by giving a brief history of melanoma causation. I then discuss the current manner in which malignant melanoma is classified. In general, these systems of classification do not take account of the manner of tumour causation. Instead, they are based on phenomenological features of the tumour, such as size, spread, and morphology. I go on to suggest that misclassification of melanoma is a major problem in clinical practice. I therefore outline an alternative means of classifying these tumours based on causal factors. By analogy with similar systems that have recently emerged for other cancers, I suggest that this causal classification is likely to be both workable and helpful, even in the absence of a full causal-mechanistic understanding of the aetiology of the tumour.
Keywords melanoma  classification  causation  mechanism
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DOI 10.1007/s11017-010-9168-3
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References found in this work BETA

Thinking About Mechanisms.Peter K. Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
In Defence of Classification.John Dupré - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 32 (2):203-219.
Understanding Mechanisms in the Health Sciences.Raffaella Campaner - 2011 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 32 (1):5-17.

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Citations of this work BETA

Nosology, Ontology and Promiscuous Realism.Nicholas Binney - 2015 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 21 (3):391-397.

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