Acta Analytica 22 (4):301-319 (2007)
It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or epistemic rationality ) can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication. The argument includes an attempt to reconcile the fundamental intuitions of the opposing parties in the debate
|Keywords||Epistemic closure Defeasibility Conclusive reasons Knowledge Epistemic justification Epistemic rationality|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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