Concepts, Intuitions and Epistemic Norms

Logos and Episteme (2):269-286 (2010)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Dual Process Theories of cognition offer a useful framework to understand the nature and role of concepts in cognitive science and intuitions in epistemology.

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Murray Clarke
Concordia University

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